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Introduction
Technological change and innovation have long been understood to be a key driver of economic growth. It is an explicit policy in most of the OECD countries to promote innovation in order to achieve sustainable economic growth. There is a vast literature that relates Research and Development (R&D) to market failures, coming from the fact that "ideas" or "knowledge" underlying the R&D process are by nature "non-excludable" and "non-rival". Thus, under competitive pricing, an innovator will not invest in his/her idea if the market price does not cover the cost of innovating. The main challenge, from a policy point of view, is then to strike a balance between giving the right incentive to innovate and allowing subsequent di¤usion of the innovation Two possibilities to overcome the public good propriety of innovation are intellectual property rights (for example patents) and government/public subsidies. A patent creates a temporary monopoly for the innovator, by preventing any other entity to use or sell the innovation whereas the governmental subsidy covers part of the cost of the innovation. However, both policies have defects: a patent creates a monopoly distortion which implies a "deadweight loss" for society and public funding of R&D implies …nancing the subsidy with tax revenues. There is a vast literature on the optimal design of the patent system, starting with Nordhaus (1969) or on patent races initiated by Reinganum (1983 Reinganum ( , 1985 . There is also a burgeoning literature that tries to assess the impact of public subsidies on private R&D, see for example the surveys by David et al. (2000) and Klette et al. (2000) . The traditional way to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of public subsidies in the economic literature is to relate the receipt of a public R&D grant on private R&D spendings at the …rm level. A majority of studies …nds a complementary relationship between these two measures, that is, they usually reject full "crowding-out". For example, Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) …nd a signi…cant e¤ect of publicly supported R&D on private R&D incurred by German …rms, while Lach (2002) …nds a positive e¤ect for small …rms and an insigni…cant one in his full sample. However, some studies …nd the opposite e¤ect. For example, Wallsten (2000) …nds a substitutive e¤ect of R&D subsidies from the SBIR program in the US and Gonzàlez et al. (2005) using Spanish data conclude that publicly sponsored R&D projects would be carried out even without the subsidy, although this would reduce their scope.
However, patent and subsidy policies are generally treated separately in the economic literature and the literature analyzing the e¤ects of blending public and private R&D incentives is meager. From a theoretical point of view, Scotchmer (2004, Chapter 5) shows that a public-private R&D partnership with mandatory matching funds will allow a public sponsor to subsidize project that would not be carried out otherwise. Romano (1989 Romano ( , 1991 shows the optimal patent design and R&D policy in a model in which both patents and public funding coexist.
The 1980 Stevenson-Wydler and Bayh-Dole acts in the US encouraged universities and private entities to patent the outcome of publicly funded research which created a debate among economists on the "quality" of university patents after this policy change (see for example Henderson et al. 1998 and Sampat et al., 2003) . However, the blending of patents and public funding goes beyond universities (see Scotchmer, 2004 and Eisenberg, 1996) and even large businesses can apply for patents on inventions partly …nanced with public funds. As pointed out by Scotchmer (2004) and Eisenberg (1996) , blending patents and public funds is a counterintuitive policy, since it requires the users to pay twice for the same innovation, …rst through taxes to …nance the subsidy and then through higher monopoly prices.
The aim of this paper is to conduct an empirical test showing whether patents that were publicly sponsored are more "important" than non-subsidized ones. In other words, instead of testing the crowding-out e¤ect, I analyze whether public subsidies create additional social value. At this end, I use the result of a recent survey of inventors in Denmark that I merged with patent citations data. It is to my knowledge the …rst attempt to assess the e¤ectiveness of R&D subsidies on the outcome for which the project was initially funded.
The main results of the paper is that subsidized inventions result in more "important" patents, as measured by the number of forward citations.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the theoretical background. Section 3 describes the data and provides the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical background Scotchmer (2004) and Romano (1989 Romano ( , 1991 have both developed models in which patent policy and subsidies can be blended. They show that the interplay between both policies will allow the funding agency to subsidize inventions that would otherwise not elicit investment because the private incentive (i.e. the patent) will not fully cover the cost of the invention. Since the empirical test relies on patented inventions only, it is worth sketching the underlying incentive mechanism and how this a¤ects the empirical results. Suppose a …rm has an "idea" which requires R&D expenditures amounting to x and therefore maximizes an objective function over the lifetime T of the patent. Now suppose that private R&D x is not su¢ cient to cover the cost of the invention. If the cost of the invention is x + S;We will assume that the …rm has the possibility to apply for a subsidy amounting to S > 0 from a policy maker.
In this model, public funding of R&D can be combined with patents. However, combining these policies comes at a cost for society. First, the patent creates a deadweight loss through proprietary pricing, by excluding consumers from buying the good, even though their willingness to pay exceeds the marginal cost. Second, there are likely to be excess social costs associated with the public funding of R&D resulting from raising tax revenues to …nance the subsidy. Following Romano (1989 Romano ( , 1991 , I assume that each monetary unit of subsidy has a social cost of 1 + , with 0 < +1. The policy-maker seeks to maximize the following social welfare function:
where m s denotes the social return ‡ow from the discovery over the duration of the patent. m s is composed of the increase in producer surplus and of the consumer surplus. Finally assuming free entry after the patent has expired, s denotes the social return ‡ow of the invention after the date T . Thus s m s is the deadweight loss associated to proprietary pricing. Let (T ) 1 e rT r for notational convenience, then (2) can be rewritten as:
Assuming that social value lasts forever, the objective of the policy-maker will be to invest in those ideas for which the discounted social value ( s =r) is greater than the social cost comprising the deadweight loss over the discounted length of patent protection ( (T ) ), the public and private R&D expenses (x) and the social cost of the subsidy (1 + )S. As pointed out by Scotchmer (2004) , the policy maker especially wants to avoid subsidizing low value inventions
The equilibrium discussed above requires that there is no asymmetric information, i.e. that the private and social value of the invention are known to both the …rm and the sponsor ex-ante. In most of the cases, however, the …rm is repository of the best information about the private value of the invention. If the social cost exceeds the sum of private and public spendings (which is likely to be the case in the model outlined above), Scotchmer (2004) suggests the …rm commits to pay the di¤erence, whereas Romano's (1989 Romano's ( , 1991 analysis implies that the policy-maker can increase monitoring of R&D outlays, which would result in an increase of the social cost through . In both cases this implies that the social value of the invention is known to both parties at least ex-post. The aim of the next section is to test whether subsidized inventions that were patented are indeed more "important" than non-subsidized patented inventions. The focus is therefore on speci…c type of research project, that received a subsidy and were subsequently patented. However, the aim in this paper is not to test whether there is a crowdingout e¤ect, i.e., whether …rm substitute their own R&D with the subsidy or whether public agencies fund projects that would have been carried out even without the subsidy because the private incentive (i.e. the patent) would have covered the cost of R&D. Instead, the goal is to undertake the more modest task of estimating the impact of public subsidies on social welfare at the patent level.
The remainder of the paper focuses on the implementation of an empirical test for the e¤ectiveness of public support to patented inventions. Before describing the results, I …rst present the dataset employed in the empirical analysis and then outline the methodology and the identi…cation strategy.
Data and variables
The data was compiled from two sources. First, I used the results of the so-called "PatVal" survey for Denmark, that contains information on 495 patents granted by the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO), with priority dates between 1993 and 1997. The PatVal project is a European-wide survey of inventors, which primary aim was to assess the economic value of European patents, by asking questions related to the personal characteristics of one of the inventors listed in the selected patents. However, the survey also asked questions related to the invention process more generally, including questions on the …nancing of the research that lead to the patent. This enables to distinguish between patents that received a R&D subsidy from those that did not. A summary of the key …ndings of the Danish PatVal survey can be found in Kaiser (2006) . Giuri et al. (2007) provide a summary of the PatVal survey for six other European countries. 1 The second source of data is the EPO/OECD patent citations database, that comprises all citations made to EPO patents in the period 1978-2006 (see Harho¤ et al., 2005 and Webb et al, 2005) .
I use the number of forward citations to the focal patent as the relevant output measure since this indicator can e¤ectively play the role of proxy for the "importance" or "quality" of a patent (see Trajtenberg, 1990 2000) further validate this indicator by …nding a signi…cant correlation between the number of forward citations to a given patent and the economic and technological "importance" of the invention (as perceived by the inventors). Since a policy maker should be interested in supporting "important" inventions as shown in the previous Section, one can expect publicly supported patents to receive more citations. Contrary to the well-known "NBER Patent Database", the "EPO/OECD patent citations database" does not contain any information on "self-citations" (i.e. the cited and citing patents are owned by the same entity). However, I would not expect any signi…cant changes in the results from excluding self-citations for two reasons. First, Sapsalis and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) found that removing self-citations in their sample of Belgian universities does neither a¤ect the magnitude, nor the signi…cance of the variables 2 . Second, unlike at the USPTO, applicants at the EPO do not have the "duty of candor", which means that there is no legal requirement to disclose prior art. The so-called "search report" that contains all citations made in a patent application is carried out by the examiner at the EPO. Simple descriptive statistics show that more than 95% of the citations in EPO patents are added by the examiner. In contrast, USPTO applicants have to provide a full list of prior art, including their own work which they know best. This suggests that the "self-bias" in EPO patent applications is presumably very low and would carry a weak informational content. Moreover, the fact that the allocation of citations follows a standardized procedure at the EPO is likely to reduce the noise contained in the forward citations as a measure of the "importance" of patents.
The main explanatory variable is a dummy indicating whether the applicant received any sort of public support to undertake the invention. Unfortunately, I am not able to distinguish between the di¤erent potential sources of public subsidy. However, as shown by Jespersen and Olsen (2007), almost all R&D subsidies in Denmark stem from the Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation.
Following the literature on patent "quality" using forward citations as a dependent variable, intrisic attributes of the patent and the underlying technology need to be controlled for. Citation measures might be in ‡uenced by variations in citation practices across time and technology areas. In addition, citations counts are usually also in ‡uenced by the truncation e¤ect, since later patents have less time to garner citations than earlier ones. Therefore it is important to control for both time and technology e¤ects (see for example Henderson et al., 1998) . For these reasons, I include dummies for di¤erent application years and six technology dummies using the so called OST-INPI-FISI classi…cation, provided by the "O¢ ce des Sciences et Techniques" (OST), the French Patent O¢ ce (INPI) and the Fraunhofer ISI Institute, which is based on a concordance with the International Patent Classi…cation (IPC) assignments.
Forward citations are subject to unobserved heterogeneity (Marco, 2007) . Building on the baseline speci…cation outlined above, I also whish to control for potential heterogeneity arising from the identity of the patent owner, the competitive environment and the invention process. This aspect has been largely neglected in the prior literature (see Cassiman et al., 2008 for an exception). Given that the analysis is con…ned at the patent level, including applicant and inventor speci…c variables is not straightforward, notably in the case of multiple ownership of the patent. However, the PatVal survey contains two interesting candidates to be included in the analysis.
In order to capture a patent's science linkage, I will include a dummy indicating whether the surveyed inventors claimed that they used universities, public research institutes or scienti…c publications to carry out the research leading to the patent (science linkage). For example, Nagaoka (2008) shows that …rms that cite scienti…c literature in their (U.S.) patents also receive, on average, more citations. Taking the question from the survey enables to have a more direct measure of an invention's science linkage.
The second additional variable included in the analysis (small …rm) is a dummy indicating whether (one of) the applicant(s) is a …rm with less than 100 employees. First, public R&D policies tend to o¤er a favorable treatment to "small …rms" 3 . Second, …rm size might a¤ect the "quality" of the invention, but the sign of this e¤ect is not obvious. On the one hand, small …rms might su¤er from de…ciencies in economies of scope and/or scale compared to larger corporations and on the other hand they may produce innovations of higher "quality" because they have a reduced bureaucratic burden in comparison to large companies (Acs and Audretsch, 1987; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006) .
Finally, to control for regional-speci…c sources of heterogeneity, I also include a set of ten dummies that indicate in which Danish region the invention took place. The literature shows that knowledge spillovers tend to be localized (Henderson et al., 1998) . These dummies will control for the presence of innovation clusters and any regional-speci…c characteristics more generally.
In addition, the data was cleaned for missing observations and inconsistencies. Table 1 shows that 11% of the …rms received a public subsidy to carry out the research leading to the patented invention.
R&D subsidies and innovative performance: the selection issue
Regressing forward citations or more generally any measure of research output on the receipt of a public grant is not unproblematic. The selection problem that arises in attempting to assess the impact of a public program is well known in the economic literature ( Ja¤e, 2002) . In fact, variables that are unobservable by the econometrician might be correlated with the receipt of a public subsidy. These variables could be the budget submitted to the agency, the agency's personal knowledge of the applicants or the quality of the research project proposed (Ja¤e, 2002) . In addition all the components of the social cost of a patented invention, as described in the theory background in Section 2, are also unobservable That is why I use an instrumental variable (IV) approach in this paper. Technically, there is no special consideration in estimating a model by IVs when the endogenous explanatory variable is a dummy (Wooldridge, 2002) . Actually, estimating the …rst stage equation with a linear probability model will yield consistent estimates (if the instruments are valid), whether or not the …rst stage equation is linear (Angrist, 2001) .
The candidate source of exogenous variation in the R&D subsidy equation is a dummy indicating whether at least one of the inventors listed in the application was employed at a university or a public research institute at the time of the invention (academic inventor). There is considerable evidence that European universities do not claim ownership of the intellectual property right even when one of their researchers took part in the invention process (see for example Guena and Nesta., 2006) . In fact, the owners of those patents are most of the time …rms. 4 It is an explicit policy of the Danish government (and most of the other European governments) to strengthen public-private collaborations, 5 thus, applications involving academic inventors are systematically favored by the funding agencies. However, "academic consulting" might have an e¤ect on the quality of the patented invention, but the sign of this e¤ect is uncertain. On the one hand, academic involvement in patents owned by corporations may lower their incentives to provide a high quality contribution (Aghion and Tirole, 1994 ) and on the other hand, a …rm can bene…t from a researcher's expertise in science intensive areas (Lacetera, 2007) . However, as mentioned above, the dummy indicating whether the surveyed inventors claimed that they used scienti…c source of knowledge to carry out the research leading to the patent is included in both stages of the model. Once this scienti…c linkage is controlled for, there is no obvious reason to think that the academic inventor dummy still a¤ects the unobservables in the equation of interest. 
Results
The regression results are presented in Table 2 . The speci…cation follows closely a well established literature that analyzes the structure of patent citations, see for example Henderson et al., (1998) or Harho¤ et al., (1999) . The reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedastisity and corrected for potential dependence of observations by respondent. Table 2 reports the baseline results of OLS regressions using the log of (one plus) the number of forward citations as the dependent variable. The subsidy dummy has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect (at the 5% level) on the number of forward citations. According to these estimates, patents that received a public subsidy are more important than others by about 20%. Columns (2) and (3) repeat the regression by sequentially introducing two additional controls. The results show that there is a slight negative e¤ect of small …rms, and that the science linkage of the invention tends to improve the quality of patents. As argued in the previous Section, OLS can only establish a correlation between the grant dummy and the outcome variable, but in this case it cannot determine a causal e¤ect of R&D grants on the "quality" of patents. This is why Table 3 repeats the regressions instrumenting for the subsidy dummy with the academic inventor variable presented above. The …rst stage regressions are reported at the bottom of the Table. The instrument is highly signi…cant and explains about 15% of the variation of the subsidy dummy. The instrumented subsidy dummy gains in signi…cance compared to OLS and the measured coe¢ cients and standard errors are of higher magnitude than in the OLS regressions resulting in wider con…dence intervals.
Regarding the statistical validity of the instrument, the Kleibergen-Paap underidenti…cation LM and Wald tests reject their null hypotheses, suggesting that the instrument is adequate to identify the equation. In addition, the academic dummy passes a standard F-test of identifying restriction.
With respect to the control variables, the results show that patents that involve a small …rm receive on average less citations once the endogenous nature of the subsidy dummy is controlled for. This result goes in the direction of the Schumpeterian argument that large …rms might be more capable of producing high quality technologies due to scale economies and advantages in accessing up-front knowledge in the market. However, no signi…cant e¤ect is found for small …rms on the propensity to be granted a R&D subsidy.
The science linkage of the invention still appears to be relevant to explain patent quality once the subsidy dummy is instrumented for, which con…rms the presumption that breakthrough innovations have a higher technological impact. As a robustness check, Table 4 repeats the regression using the dummy endogenous variable IV regression model following Wooldridge (2002) . This estimator is more e¢ cient than the traditional 2SLS model and has several robustness properties, but requires to make stronger assumptions. The estimation of this model consists of two steps: (i) estimate a binary response model (probit or logit) of the dummy endogenous subsidy variable on all exogenous variables (including the instruments) and obtain the …tted probabilities, say Thus, the conclusion for all three models is that publicly subsidized inventions lead to patents of higher "importance" as measured by the number of forward citations. The literature on the evaluation of public funding generally analysis how public subsidies relate to private R&D. The results of this paper show that public subsidies have a positive impact on the outcome for which the project was initially funded. Using patent data solely enables to improve our understanding of the role of governement-sponsored research at the project level.
Conclusion
Innovation is widely recognized as being a major determinant of economic growth. Therefore, public initiatives aim at increasing the current level of innovative activity. In this context, the evaluation of these public policy is crucial in order to determine which policy tools are the most e¤ective.
Most of the existing empirical literature shows that public subsidies to R&D are e¤ective in stimulating private R&D (David et al., 2000; Aerts and Czarnitzki, 2008) . However, little is known about the e¤ect of these subsidies on innovative output. The aim of this paper was to assess whether R&D subsidies create additional social value by testing the e¤ectiveness of public support to patented inventions. The results show that subsidized inventions result in more "important" patents, as measured by the number of forward citations.
Two important limitations of this analysis (and opportunities for future work) should be noted. The empirical analysis is con…ned to inventions that were successfully patented. The data did not enable me to track inventions that were subsidized but not patented either because of a contractual agreement between the sponsor and the applicant or because the research was unsuccessful. At the same time, the data does not allow me to test the "crowding-out" hypothesis, in other words, this speci…cation does not answer the question as to whether the research would have been carried out even without the subsidy. However, most of the recent empirical work in this area concludes that this would not be the case. 
